The Board of County Commissioners had presented to it today a petition for the establishment of a new township to be composed of parts of Sharon and Crab Orchard townships. On account of an irregularity in the form of the petition, the board was unable to give it consideration. The law relating to the creation of new townships signifies that notice of such application to be made to the Board of County Commissioners must be printed for four weeks prior to the date on which the application is made and notice also shall be posted in the communities involved in the change.
Chairman McLaughlin called the attention of the petitions to the fact that this phase of the law had not been complied with and that the board could not give the petition consideration at all until this formality had been abided by.
The supposition is that the petitioners will seek to comply with the terms of the law between this date and the meeting of the board in October, at which time the opposition to the creation of the new township, if there shall be any, will have an opportunity to express itself.
The territory which the petitioners seek to include in the proposed township embraces the Western edge of Crab Orchard and the Eastern edge of Sharon townships, territory incorporated Rama Rural Community.
From The Charlotte News, Tuesday, Sept. 6, 1921
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State v. . Rural Community, 109 S.E. 576 (N.C. 1921)
Supreme Court of North Carolina
Filed: November 30th, 1921
Precedential Status: Precedential
Citations: 109 S.E. 576, 182 N.C. 861
Docket Number: Unknown
Author: William A. Hoke
The action is instituted by the State on relation of the Attorney-General to annul the charter of the Rama Rural (862) Community on the grounds alleged in the complaint, that the requirements of the statute under which the charter purported to have been issued, C.S. 7380, had not been complied with, and that on the facts presented the alleged charter was not authorized by said statute. The complaint, among others, containing allegations that the petitioners in their written application for the charter had made it appear that he proposed community embraced one entire school district, and had concealed from the Secretary of State the essential fact that it contained parts of three school districts in said county, each of which constituted a separate special school tax district in said county, the said statute providing that a charter of this kind in question may only be issued for territory embracing one entire school district.
Defendants demurred, and for the reasons chiefly: (1) That the courts are without jurisdiction to question the acts of the Secretary of State in issuing the charter, or his findings of fact concerning the same; (2) that relator of plaintiff has no legal right to maintain the action; (3) that the complaint does not contain facts sufficient to *Page 924 justify the relief sought nor any other relief within the scope of the pleadings, etc.
Judgment overruling the demurrer, and the defendant excepted and appealed. Chapter 123 provides for incorporation of rural communities on petition of a majority of their registered voters, and when embracing "in area one entire school district." Section 7380, the first of the chapter, requires this allegation as a part of the petition, and section 7381 provides that the Secretary of State, to whom the petition shall be addressed, shall issue the certificate of incorporation if the petition is in due form. It thus appears that this privilege is only conferred upon communities of the kind described, and it being admitted by the demurrer that the defendant, the community in question here, is composed not of one entire school district, but of parts of three different school districts. The petitioners have not brought themselves within the terms of the statute and the certificate of incorporation has been issued without warrant of law. The position that only communities embracing in area "one (863) entire school district" have the right of incorporation under the law finds full support, if any were needed, from a stipulation in section 7380, that, "After any school district has been incorporated under the provisions of this article, the boundaries of such school district may be changed only in the manner prescribed by law for changing the lines of a special school-tax district except that the county board of education shall proceed to enlarge such boundaries in accordance with law and on written request of a majority of the school committeemen or trustees of said school district, and a written request of a majority of the board of directors of the incorporated rural community." Thus, again showing the intent of the Legislature that the territorial boundaries as designated should be considered of the substance and essential to a valid incorporation under the law, a principle of interpretation recognized and approved in an opinion of the Court at the present term, in Woosley v. Comrs.,ante, 429.
It was chiefly insisted for the defendant that the demurrer should be sustained from lack of authority in the Attorney-General as relator *Page 925 to institute and maintain the action. It was formerly held that the Attorney-General, of his own motion and without legislative sanction, could not bring an action to vacate a legislative charter. Under the present law, however, this authority has been provided for in certain designated instances appearing in C.S. 1187. As appertaining to the question presented here, this power was given in terms as follows: "An action may be brought by the Attorney-General in the name of the State against a corporation for the purpose of annulling its charter upon the ground that it was procured upon a fraudulent suggestion or concealment of a material fact by the persons incorporated or by some of them, or with their knowledge or consent," etc.
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To read the rest of the case, go to www.courtlistener.com/opinion/3904316/state-v-rural-community/
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